Commentaries

Reemergence of Terror Networks in Jammu and Kashmir: Evaluating the State's Response Mechanisms

R. BHANU KRISHNA KIRAN
September 11, 2024

Following major crackdown on terrorists in the Kashmir Valley and the redeployment of troops from the southern Pir Panjal range to Ladakh due to the ongoing border standoff with China, terrorists have shifted their base from Kashmir to the Jammu region. This shift is particularly evident in areas such as Rajouri, Poonch, Doda, Kishtwar, and Kathua, where dense forests and steep mountains offer militants ample cover. The hilly districts of Poonch and Rajouri, which lie along the porous 225-kilometer Line of Control (LoC), are easily accessible to Pakistan-backed proxy terrorists. This has led to frequent attacks on security forces, resulting in the loss of personnel.

Additionally, foreign militants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan Afghanistan, returnees from Syria, and former Pakistani soldiers trained in guerrilla warfare are prepared to launch attacks in these areas. They are armed with sophisticated weapons, including M4 assault rifles once used by U.S. forces against the Taliban, Russian-made AK-47s, Chinese arms, and encrypted radio communication devices.

Operation SarpVinash 2.0

Understanding the fast deteriorating situation, the Indian army initiated 'Operation SarpVinash 2.0', a revised strategy that included force deployments, good intelligence, technology, coordination, and local support to neutralize the active terrorists in the area. The Indian army has deployed 500 Para Special Force Commandos, 200 snipers and also additional forces of about 3,500-4,000 personnel in the troubled region to locate and dismantle terrorists and their networks. To support these units, the Indian government ordered the transfer of two BSF battalions, comprising over 2,000 personnel, from Odisha to the Jammu region. However, coordination is indispensable between these forces and forces already taking part in operations, i.e.Rashtriya Rifles, Special Operations Group of Jammu and Kashmir Police, Romeo and Delta forces, White Knight Corps (Army's 16 Corps) and as well with intelligence agencies. It is crucial to share intelligence inputs to detect and prevent early terror activities. To leverage their strength, they must be centralized cooperatives that can integrate their activities. In that course of action, in July 2024, Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha and Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi reviewed the situation with IB Chief Tapan Deka, RAW Chief Ravi Sinha, BSF Director General Nitin Agarwal, CRPF DG Anish Dayal Singh and J&K Police DG R R Swain. 'Operation SarpVinash 2.0'administered in partnership with all security agencies involved, who have to report directly to the National Security Advisor and the Chief of Army Staff. It is the most meaningful anti-terrorism endeavour in decades under the supervision of the Prime Minister's Office.   Moreover, to boost counter-terror operations, Nalin Prabhat,  a 1992-batch IPS officer and an expert in dealing with high-risk and complex security conditions,  has been appointed as   Special Director-General until September 30, 2024, after that, he will be the Director General of Police (DGP), Jammu and Kashmir.

Stepping up Human Intelligence

Defence analysts believe that the reasons behind the heavy casualties among security personnel in the area are a lack of credible human intelligence (HUMINT) and the deviation of security agencies from the prescribed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), i.e. tactics used to hunt down militants and to recover weapons in the targeted area. It gives the impression that there is negligence in the intelligence operations of the region, as it was peaceful for two decades. In any case, RAW and DIA must be alert, at least after the troops are relocated to China's border. The failure of warning intelligence, which is more significant in preventing future attacks, is visible in the attacks and deaths. Some intelligence experts believe the malfunction is due to the enormous focus on electronic intelligence, signal intelligence and technical intelligence (TECHINT) in preference to the intelligence gathering from human resources (HUMINT).

In J&K, about 80% of intelligence inputs are spawned through mobile or landline phone call records, emails, satellite images, social media posts, and Google locations. However, currently, terror groups are escaping the surveillance equipment of security forces with their advanced technology. As a result, intelligence agencies are failing to gather information about the movement and activities of terrorists hiding in the area. It is high time to put more focus on human intelligence. The Kokernag operations reveal that security forces are finally getting actionable intelligence against the terrorists. Intelligence inputs indicate that as many as 35 Pakistani nationals belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammedled by Rauf Asghar, brother of Masood Azhar, have crossed over into J&K.

Challenges Ahead

It is challenging to locate the terrorist hideouts deep in the mountains with conventional reconnaissance tactics such as scouting with satellite cameras, electronic surveillance and infrared imaging. It is difficult, too, to get high-definition photos due to the towering cliffs, dense forests, and high altitude of the satellites. Although drones and other surveillance equipment have been deployed, micro drones, small and not easily detected by militants, provide accurate intelligence in detecting the terrorist's hidden hideouts in mountains and dense forests. 

According to Brigadier Neeraj Bali (Retd.), in the 1990s-2000, terrorists infiltrated the areas of Rajouri, Surankote, Poonch, and Kalakote. They became active after the militants got the support of a section of the population who are Pahari-speaking Kashmiris. According to media reports, now there are about 300 over-ground workers (OGW) active in J&K to provide logistic support to terror groups. In mid-August 2024, the J&K Police arrested 8 OGW of terrorists involved in providing militants with logistical support and guiding them to the mountainous and jungle areas of the Udhampur-Kathua-Doda districts. Security agencies need to get local support in the Jammu region to build a trusted network to defeat the terrorists by winning the "hearts and minds" and turning them away from cross-border terrorists and their promises by assuring their basic needs. It was manifested in eradicating terrorism in Jammu from 1995 to 2003. Now, the army wants to activate Village Defence Guards (VDGs) to utilize their deep knowledge of the complicated local terrain to find terrorist hideouts. The recent operation in Kokernag, with the help of locals, emphasizes the role of local communities and the necessity of security forces to build relationships with local people.  In the last week of August this year, the security forces foiled two infiltration bids along the LOC in the Kupwara district of J&K, killing three terrorists. In a major achievement, with inputs from intelligence agencies and J&K police on September 8, during the ongoing 'Operation Kanchi', security forces neutralized two terrorists. They recovered large numbers of arms and ammunition in Nowshera. 

The resurgence of terrorism poses new security threats in Jammu, prompting India to strike back to the expansion of terror operations into urban areas within Jammu to disturb communal harmony at the high time of the forthcoming elections. Therefore, a coordinated strategy reevaluating their tactics and gaps between actionable intelligence and armed retort with an unsullied, technology-driven approach, proper HUMINT, and sound coordination with the local civilian population will remove the terrorist infrastructure across the complex terrain. 

Author Note
Dr R. Bhanu Krishna Kiran is an independent International Law & Strategic Affairs researcher.