Commentaries

The Beijing Declaration: Path to Genuine Palestinian Unity or an Illusion of Consensus?

HARSH KUMAR UPADHAYAY
August 23, 2024

Since the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israel, West Asia has become the epicentre of geopolitical strife. Each day brings new sensational developments that quickly overshadow previous events. However, amidst the ongoing war in Gaza, a notable development has garnered the attention of geopolitical analysts, security experts, and Middle East observers. Fourteen distinct Palestinian political factions, including Hamas and Fatah, united to sign a pact aimed at bolstering unity to put an end to their yearslong ongoing rivalry. Facilitated by China and signed on July 23 2024, "the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity" seeks to resolve the intra-Palestinian rivalry that has resulted in protracted periods of conflict and impasse in the political process. It also aims to establish an interim National Unity government, followed by an agreement that underscores the necessity of early elections.  It will be accompanied by a robust follow-up mechanism to ensure post-conflict reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Furthermore, the declaration presents a unified stance against the United States' perceived pro-Israel bias, advocating for a comprehensive peace conference involving major global powers, including China and Russia. The joint declaration also emphasises the importance of territorial unity, rejecting any form of trusteeship for Gaza and stressing the indivisibility of Gaza and the West Bank. The declaration also endorses the principles enshrined in UN Resolution 181, which supports establishing an interim Palestinian state as a crucial step towards achieving lasting peace and self-determination.

However, this is not the first agreement between Hamas and Fatah. Several agreements have been signed since the onset of the political tension between these two factions, which came to the fore after Yasser Arafat's death and which further intensified following Hamas's victory in the Palestinian Authority's Parliamentary elections of 2006.

A Tale of Agreements

Starting from the Palestinian Cairo Declaration of 2005 to the signing of the Palestinian Prisoners Document in 2006, followed by the Fatah-Hamas Mecca Agreement of 2007, agreements after agreements have been signed with an intent to resolve the conflict. Throughout these years, both these Palestinian factions have further engaged in several dialogues and reconciliations ranging from the Sana'a Declaration to the Doha Agreement, from Cario to Algiers to Damascus, and even meeting at Moscow and Istanbul. Despite all these successive agreements and deals, they haven't succeeded in putting an end to the Palestinian factional divide.

For years, both these factions have been at loggerheads, wherein they have had significant ideological and methodological differences regarding the creation of a Palestinian state and their visions for governance. Hamas subscribes to Islamic ideological orientations, advocating for armed resistance against Israel, while Fatah claims to be secular, favouring dialogue and negotiations. Hamas does not recognise Israel but accepts a Palestinian state on the 1967 border. In contrast, Fatah recognises Israel and aims to build an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.

Nevertheless, amid the ongoing war in Gaza, these prominent factional groups have once again come together to shed their differences and pose a unified challenge to Israel. However, the question arises: is this agreement any different from all the previous ones between Hamas, Fatah, and several other Palestinian groups?  The answer, as always, lies in the details.

A Repackaged Iteration of Previous Deals

Notably, the provisions of the Beijing Declaration designating the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people is not a novel concept but rather a reiteration of the 2005 Cairo Declaration. Similarly, the agreement to establish a national unity government has been a recurring theme, previously discussed and agreed upon in various declarations, including the Palestinian Prisoners Document, the Mecca Agreement, and the Sana'a Agreement. Likewise, the 2011 Cairo Agreement, signed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, had outlined the formation of a transitional government of technocrats to prepare for elections and paved the way for Hamas' integration into the Palestine Liberation Organization. Similar provisions were once again reiterated in the 2014 Gaza and Cairo Agreements. Very recently, in 2017, Fatah and Hamas had an agreement regarding new dialogue for a Unity government and elections, which was followed by the 2022 Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement held in Algiers, in which 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, agreed to hold Presidential and Parliamentary elections within a year.

It is pertinent to note that despite the series of agreements spanning over a decade, the Palestinian political factions have systematically failed to implement and execute the agreed provisions. Despite all these successive agreements, they haven't succeeded in conducting even a single parliamentary election since 2006. It is difficult to comprehend the frustration engendered by this series of reconciliation agreements, especially for those Palestinians who are curious, interested and waiting for these reconciliation efforts to fructify their potential for effective execution and meaningful progress. The provisions of the Beijing Declaration, thus, appear to be a rehashed version of previous accords, rephrased and slightly modified to present a new iteration, which has only achieved broad principles but not a comprehensive agreement.

Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of this agreement is Fatah's acceptance of Hamas's stance, which calls for resistance to the occupation by any means necessary, including armed struggle. This contradicts Fatah's traditional doctrine, which calls for negotiations and dialogue. The most probable reason for Fatah's acceptance of these demands might have stemmed from multiple objectives, including calming the anger of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, which perceives the Fatah-dominated PA (Palestinian Authority) to be hand-in-gloves with Israel and which is increasingly supportive of the resistance narrative. Additionally, Fatah might have accepted this demand to delay the reform of the PLO (given the history), buy time to restrict Hamas and other factions from practically gaining ground in the organisation, and wait to watch how the results of American elections will unfold.  These speculated reasons become even more evident due to the absence of any specific timeline in the agreement, which would have ensured the implementation of the provisions to make it a reality. Furthermore, this declaration has failed to address a critical issue regarding the security control over Gaza. While Fatah has demanded that all the weapons and military capabilities should be entrusted under the authority of one unified force, Hamas, on the contrary, has opposed this demand by stating that it will not dismantle its military, the Qassam Brigades.

It is thus clear that a comprehensive Palestinian unity will require a structural change in the Palestinians' political and ideological orientations, deep reform and inclusion of all factions in their institutions, coupled with democratic elections, and, above all, a consensus to rebuild Gaza after the war ends.

A Diplomatic Gain for China

The Beijing Declaration demonstrates China's desire to project itself as a responsible major power. It reflects China's willingness to position itself as a mediator, offering an alternative form of diplomacy distinct from that of the United States. China wants to present itself as a neutral and impartial facilitator to convince Arabs and Palestinians that its style of diplomacy is fundamentally different from the United States, which is perceived as tacitly supporting Israel's interests by perpetuating divisions among Palestinians.

Whether the Palestinian factions will resolve their conflict remains to be seen. Still, the Beijing Declaration represents another significant diplomatic achievement for China after successfully brokering the March 2023 détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Unlike the previous mediators, like Egypt or Algeria, whose mediators had minimal geopolitical clout and limited influence, China, in contrast, is a rising global power with considerable geopolitical clout. China can influence Palestinian factions meaningfully and press them for a desired outcome. China's role as a facilitator, therefore, cannot be ignored.

Author Note
Harsh Kumar Upadhayay is a Senior Research Fellow (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) at the Indian Institute of Technology-Madras, Chennai.