Elusive Peace Process and Maoist Violence in Nepal

Even as the nine-day-long ceasefire called by Maoist extremists during the ‘Dashain’ festival ended on October 28, civil society groups urged the Maoists to continue the truce until December this year when an international Buddhist convention will be held in Lumbini in southern Nepal. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba has refused to extend the ceasefire unilaterally. The government started the offensive immediately, but it stopped just before the truce. At least ten extremists were gunned down in separate encounters in the Taplejung and Siraha districts within 48 hours of the truce. Now, fears of a possible escalation in violence between the Government troops and Maoists have increased manifold in this restive Himalayan Kingdom.

In Nepal, violence has increased substantially since peace talks between the government and Maoists collapsed in 2003 over the demand for a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution for the Communist Republic, abolishing the existing constitutional Monarchy. To recommence the talks, the present government formed a High-Level Peace Committee (HLPC) in August 2004. During its first meeting on September 22, the committee invited Maoists for a constructive dialogue, which was outrightly rejected by the Maoists spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara, questioning the government's sincerity. Two days later, Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda showed a willingness to sit for negotiations. But before that, he volleyed a series of questions for the government. He expressed reservations about government competence in reverting the Royal move of October 4, 2002, when the King appointed a Prime Minister to suspend the existing democracy. He also doubts the government’s reluctance to engage the United Nations or international human rights organizations for peace talks and the government’s control over the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). 

Emphasising the present government’s competence to resolve the crisis, HLPC responded by saying that Deuba’s re-appointment as premier proves returning to the pre-October 2002 situation. The RNA, other security agencies, and all constitutional and political bodies are under government control. On the one hand, the government has been untiringly asking Maoists to come forward for talks, but in reality, it has not shown any positive move. On the ground, it has been intimidating the Maoists with the help of the army. Adopting a twin-track approach initiated large-scale army operations since October 13 in Maoist strongholds. The underlying purpose of this operation was to force the Maoists to the negotiating table by creating psychological pressure. 

Maoists have been campaigning for the UN and other rights groups’ involvement in talks but never exhibited any positive leaning. In contrast, the guerilla leaders believe the offensive is the only key to establishing a republican regime. At the recent party plenary meeting held in the first week of September, Maoist leaders have vowed to continue further offensive. However, in a tactical move to draw public support and partially due to public pressure, Maoists declared a unilateral ceasefire during the Dashain festival.

Both parties are busy accusing each other of not being serious and playing their own tactics. The government has aggressively initiated army operations to contain Maoists' actions and force them to the negotiating table. Similarly, Maoists are endlessly involved in violent activities, even during the ceasefire period. They have been killing and abducting civilians, students, and security personnel. Although the government’s pressure tactic forced the Maoists to announce a truce, experts believed that Maoists must have exploited this truce period to regroup, rearm, and re-organize. 

Certain issues of contention obstruct peace talks. The government wants the Maoists to end violence and accept the multi-party political system and the present constitution. However, the Maoists are adamant about their earlier demands. They also want terrorist tags and red corner notices against them removed. Now, it seems the atmosphere created by the temporary truce has been lost. The government could have extended the ceasefire period by reciprocating the Maoists’ unilateral offer and probably not initiating the offensive immediately. 

Maoists have already taken the initiative by declaring a ceasefire, but there are reports of violations, too. Though the government has reciprocated lately, it has to facilitate things without any outright rejection of demands and offensive operations against Maoist cadres. Also, it has to restrain its intimidating statements, which can further cause mistrust. Now, the Deuba government in Nepal is quite adamant about initiating the electoral process after two months, whether the Maoists come for dialogue or not. 

Conventional wisdom suggests further delay in establishing peace will invite more chaos and bloodshed in the country. The hindering issues can be discussed once negotiation starts. The talks should also be unconditional, with compliance from both sides to formulate reasonable cooperation and ready to find a lasting solution. Then again, the entire clamour for talks will not turn into veracity unless the warring parties demonstrate willingness to sit across the table.