Democratic Pakistan and the Global War on Terror

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, resulted in a historic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as a vital ally of the U.S. in the global war to counter-terrorism. Though barely realized, in February 2008, this war entered a new phase. The U.S. had thus far fought the war against terrorism with the support of the dictatorial regime of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The parliamentary elections in Pakistan in February 2008 transferred political authority in favour of the democratically elected government. The war on terrorism will be profoundly impacted by the response of democratic Pakistan to the strong anti-American sentiments within the country and the lucrative aid offered by the U.S. for continued support in the counter-terrorism efforts.

The Pakistani government and the Bush administration are attempting to reformulate their mutual relationship in the counterterrorism campaign. The Pakistani government is seeking to pursue a more independent policy on countering terrorism, while the U.S. is repackaging proposals to win the support of the new Pakistani government. 

The new government has clearly stated its intention of re-working Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S. Several decisions are beginning to reflect policy changes. The leaders of the new coalition government in Pakistan have decided to open negotiations with the militants, who continue to target civilians through suicide attacks. This is a marked departure from President Musharraf’s aggressive approach towards militants. It has been communicated to the U.S. that henceforth, all political decisions, including proposals for implementing the US-Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, will be subject to the approval by the Pakistani Parliament. This implies that the U.S. counter-terrorism proposals would now face opposition from several quarters and require a longer time to gain approval. The U.S. has been asked to define the war on terrorism clearly. At the same time, the Pakistani government has gone ahead with drafting a peace agreement with the Taliban militants in the tribal regions of the country. The Pakistani government has also released Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who is the founder of the militant outfit spearheading the resistance movement against the U.S. in Afghanistan in 2001. The Pakistani government shows signs of pursuing an independent policy in forging foreign relations. As a marked departure, the Pakistani High Commissioner to India has insisted on conducting a bilateral dialogue with India, disfavoring excessive U.S. involvement. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, a staunch rival of the US, will visit Pakistan next week to meet the new government. 

The Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to re-group due to their ability to gain sanctuary in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Consequently, American commanders in Afghanistan have, in recent months, urged a widening of the war that could include American attacks on the tribal areas inside Pakistan. As a gesture to win the new government's support, the Bush administration has refused to implement any such plans. On the contrary, the U.S. has promised to curb the strikes by U.S. Predator drones in Pakistan tribal areas, which were initiated in January this year under an agreement between the U.S. military and President Musharraf. Even though the U.S. military officials consider that attempts by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the militant will allow the latter to rearm, official opposition to the move is muted. To strengthen relations with the newly elected government of Pakistan in March 2008, the Bush administration sought to put a bill providing Pakistan with an aid package worth more than $7 billion before Congress. Pakistan will also be given a "democracy dividend" of up to $1bn, a reward for holding peaceful elections and forming a coalition government.

For the Pakistani government and the Bush administration, modification is as challenging as continuing the current approaches. The U.S. and Pakistan must balance national compulsions with coalitional compromises and concessions. The Pakistani leaders have not provided any specific formula for negotiating with militants, nor have they singled out the groups that they intend to initiate the dialogue with. The Pakistani political parties could indulge in anti-U.S. rhetoric to gain popular support. Even if the leaders seek to distance Pakistan from the U.S., the two countries are bound by various strategic and economic agreements. These linkages will significantly reduce the ability of the Pakistani government to manoeuvre. For example, America is sponsoring a $400 million plan to train Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force patrolling the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. In a situation where the Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Defense has to publish its report only after receiving financing from the U.S. state agency, the ability of the new government to disassociate itself from the U.S. appears to be limited.

The U.S. had forged a less troublesome alliance with Pakistan under the regime of President Musharraf, while the future interactions with democratic Pakistan appear challenging. The U.S. is currently focused on building a stable relationship with the new government, even at the cost of temporarily altering its counter-terrorism strategy in the region. On the other hand, the Pakistani government is consciously altering its counter-terrorism strategy to gain political stability within the country. The U.S. and Pakistan struggle to realize the challenges inherent in forging partnerships between democracies, contradicting tenets of the classical democratic peace theory.