Radicalization, Terrorism and Community Engagement in India-I
The arrest of the suspects of terror activities in Bangalore, Nanded, and Hyderabad and the low-intensity bomb explosions in Pune on 1 August 2012 are pointing fingers at the involvement of some Indian Muslims. Earlier also, many of the terrorist attacks against cities in India had been conceptualized and planned by Indian Muslims who sought to attack their own country. Despite these events, India has not taken any comprehensive community engagement programme (CEP) to engage the Muslim community to check radicalization, which is a solid tool for controlling homegrown terrorism.
It is indisputably exposed from the Administrative Reforms Commission’s (ARC) Fifth Report on “Public Order” in June 2007, Seventh Report on “Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution” in February 2008, and Eighth report entitled “Combating Terrorism: Protecting through Righteousness”, in October 2008. These reports have not discussed any initiative or proposal to craft a CEP to engage the Muslim community.
Indian state may be undoubtedly confident of the long-established norms of peaceful co-existence and multiple respects, which are still intact and unbroken. India's Hindu and Muslim generations had found their balance and paved their social compact. This compact has been respected and continued to work well over a long period of time. Indian society has absorbed Muslims into its mainstream. The roots of communal concord and secularism are extremely rich. Many famous film stars like Saharuk Khan, Salman Khan, and Amir Khan etc. are Muslims. Many Muslims have held office as presidents, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, chief justice of India, and chief of the air staff, and they have also held posts in Indian administrative services.
Even major conflicts like incidents in Gujarat and the demolition of Babri Masjid have not stopped the majority of the Muslims, who are still in the mainstream of the nation. B. Raman observes, “The Indian Muslim community, despite feeling hurt because of the large-scale anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, has remained fiercely loyal, law-abiding and forward-looking. It has kept its distance from Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF) and repulsed the approaches of Pakistani jihadi organizations aligned with Al Qaeda.” Muslims in India are more resistant but not immune to radical messages. For example, the New Delhi bombings email portrays a photograph of a Muslim man caught in anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002. The email said, “Never assume that we have forgotten the demolition of Babri Masjid and, by Allah, we can never forget it.” The 2008 serial bomb blasts by terrorists of Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Islamic Student Movement of India (SIMI) in alliance with Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Abu Jundal’s alleged involvement in the 11/26 terror attack notified India to check the trends and tendencies of the homegrown terrorists.
The primary interest of the Muslim population is physical security for themselves and their families. When Indian government or particular state government fails to provide security of Muslims in communal conflicts or any terrorist operations in a particular area, they are much more likely to seek alternative security guarantees which can easily be anticipated by terror groups to lend their services. . When security forces provide physical security, Muslims are more likely to support the government against the terrorists. The provision of security must occur in conjunction with economic and social reforms in a way that implements the recommendations of the Sachar Committee Report (2006).
The Sachar Committee Report approves that 50% of the Indian Muslims’ are illiterate and living below the poverty line. There are 150 million Muslims in India, but there are only 4% are graduates, 5% have employment in the government sector, and their reach of education is very much limited. Such severely restricted access to literacy raises anger and antipathy in Muslim youth and shows the way to extremism and terrorism. For instance, IM had preferred North Bihar as a good recruitment place for operatives chosen from unemployed youth from acutely poor families. It found vast support from the unemployed Muslim youth.
Instead of the poverty mentioned above and the illiteracy situation, there is another dimension for terrorism in India. Generally, there is a notion that the underprivileged Muslims inculcated and influenced by radical discussion groups and supported by Pakistan are engrossed in terror activities. Virtually many terrorists come from comfortable and contented families and have university-level education. Since the arrests of the 2003 blasts in Mumbai, it has been demonstrated that poverty is not the primary breeding ground for terrorists. Of the 23 arrested, there were one doctoral student, an MBA graduate, five engineers, three physicians, and two college graduates. Further, an aeronautical engineer, two chemical engineers, and a computer technologist were arrested.
Interestingly, all these terrorists are manifestations of radical consciousness among the Muslim middle class in India. These educated Muslims were not despondent materially; they were dejected on social and religious grounds. They are susceptible to the stimulating lexis from inappropriate groups and judge that violence is acceptable when it has a raison d'être.
Therefore, a CEP concentrating on economic growth, eradicating unemployment, providing job-oriented technical education and training courses, and improving social infrastructure through capacity-building measures (CBMs) would play a vital role in such areas. Also, to stop this radicalization-fostering terror threat, the Indian government has to embark on a comprehensive CEP by utilizing the Muslim intelligentsia and proactive participation of the Muslim community.
Given such an explicit situation, the Indian counterterrorism strategy should include a CEP, which has to aim at the primary, economic, social and religious security of Muslims to gain their support and confidence. Muslims and their support to combat terrorism is the centre of gravity, and the Indian state should achieve that through fabricated CEP activities that seek to enlighten, educate, entertain and convince Muslims of the success of India’s war on terrorism. The support of Muslims depends on how the actions of the government reflect an apprehensive commitment and accountability to Muslim citizens and how effectively it is engaging the community.