Thirty Years of BTWC: A Fact Sheet
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and their destruction, better known as the BTWC or BWC, attained thirty years of existence on March 26, 2005. The BTWC, a multilateral treaty, was negotiated from 1969-1971. It was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington DC on April 10, 1972. It entered into force on March 26, 1975, with 43 member countries, after ratification by the three Depository States—the USA, the Soviet Union (erstwhile) and the United Kingdom. The Convention has fifteen Articles. It has 153 state parties, 16 signatory states that have yet to ratify the convention, and 25 non-signatory states. Five Review Conferences (RevCons) have been held in Geneva, and several Ad Hoc Group and Expert meetings have been held. Still, the States Parties have not agreed on strengthening the convention with strong mechanisms to monitor, verify or enforce state compliance. Some of the major landmarks are chronicled here.
March 3—21, 1980 (First Review Conference): Welcomed declarations already made and called on the rest of the State Parties to come clean on their BWC status. The RevCon had initiated the sharing of legislative experience by inviting the State Parties, which had taken action under Article IV (National measures) to make the relevant legislative and administrative texts available through the UN for emulation purposes and recognized the right of any party to request a consultative meeting at the expert level under Article V, which calls for consultations and cooperation on any problem that might arise about the Convention. State Parties had reaffirmed their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925.
September 8—26, 1986 (Second Review Conference): State parties agreed to exchange information annually in two areas: Research centres or laboratories that meet exceptionally high national or international safety standards and the unnatural outbreak of diseases. They agreed to encourage the publication of research related to the BTWC and to promote the use of knowledge and contact between scientists. The RevCon strengthened the procedures for consultation to address its compliance concerns. It called for a meeting of experts, which worked out confidence-building measures in 1987.
September 9—22, 1991 (Third Review Conference): This RevCon added details to the information exchange established in the 1986 conference. Four information declarations were added: 1) description of all offensive and defensive BW programs on or after January 1, 1946, 2) declaration of future research and development programmes in BTW defence, 3) information on human vaccine production facilities, and 4) reports as to what BWC States Parties have done as national measures to implement the BWC. It was decided that future RevCon would be held once every five years. It recognized the need for more robust measures. It mandated convening an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical point of view.
March 1992—September 1993 (VEREX): VEREX held four meetings in Geneva between these periods. In 1994, VEREX was disbanded, and twenty-one verification measures were developed, grouped into two categories: Off-Site and On-Site.
September 19—30, 1994 (Special Conference on Biological Weapons): Seventy-nine State Parties attended the Special Conference in Geneva and agreed to establish an ad hoc group (AHG) to consider the twenty-one verification measures suggested by VEREX and to make proposals to strengthen the treaty at the next (4th) Review Conference in 1996.
September 1994- May 2001 (The Ad Hoc Group): The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) was established to consider four issues: 1) definitions of terms and objectives criteria, 2) confidence-building and transparency measures, 3) measures to promote compliance, and 4) measures to implement Article X (Cooperate for peaceful purposes) of the Convention. The AHG functioned through Friends of the Chair (FOC), who led the discussion on particular aspects of the mandate. The AHG had held twenty-three sessions till May 2001 and had met for about sixty-two weeks over six long years. The last (twenty-fourth) session scheduled for July 23 —August 17, 2001, was suspended due to the US rejecting the Chair’s Text.
November 25—December 06, 1996 (Fourth Review Conference): It addressed issues such as Article I, which defines the fundamental prohibitions or the scope of the Convention; Article IV, which addresses national implementation measures; Article V, which deals with the consultative process for problems arising from Treaty implementation; and Article X which concerns cooperation among State Parties for peaceful purposes. Given recent scientific and technological developments, it emphasized the increasing importance of Article X. It stressed that the measures to implement this Article had to be consistent with the objectives and purposes of the BWC. The most significant outcome was the approval of the AHG.
November 19—December 07, 2001 (Fifth Review Conference): The Fifth Review Conference opened in Geneva and agreed at its sixth plenary meeting on 7 December 2001 to adjourn its proceedings and reconvene in Geneva after one year. Because the conference took place four months after the AHG had disagreed on a legally binding Protocol for checking compliance with the BWC, a key objective of the RevCon was to identify alternative strategies for strengthening the Convention. The United States tabled a proposal to eliminate the Ad Hoc Group at the last moment, which was rejected by other delegations, blocking consensus on the Final Declaration. To prevent the outright failure of the Review Conference, the chairman suspended the meeting for one year.
November 11—22, 2002 (Resumed Fifth Review Conference): The resumed Fifth RevCon ended with a fresh approach to combat the proliferation and use of bioweapons. It was stipulated that state parties would meet annually in the lead-up to the next RevCon in 2006. It has also been decided that a two-week discussion of experts would be held preparatory to each annual meeting. The objective of the entire exercise was to promote common understanding and effective action on a range of issues pertinent to strengthening the convention. Every annual meeting before the Sixth Review Conference has to spotlight different elements: in 2003, there were consultations on national implementation measures; in 2004, the process concentrated on enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of the alleged use of bioweapons on suspicious outbreak of disease; and in 2005, the meeting need to address codes of conduct for scientists.