Non-alignment is back through a recent Report prepared and published by the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, in February 2012. Reminiscent of a movie sequel, it is refreshed, repackaged, updated and delivered in a 2.0 form, titled “Non-Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century”. And like most movie sequels today, it also runs on an altogether new script with only an imaginary connection to the first. Why stick to the name then?

In spite of the seemingly difficult terrain in generating and implementing confidence-building measures in South Asia, all are not doom and gloom. It is thus plausible to make the following conclusions based on existing regional and sub-regional arrangements in South Asia.

India and Pakistan, as the two new de facto nuclear weapon states in the nuclear club since 1998, have embarked upon some meaningful nuclear risk reduction measures through a series of bilateral agreements.

In the era of aggressive globalization, block politics hardly matters. But, economic integration, free trade, GDP growth, connectivity through infrastructure development does matter most to the international system. Where all the leaders have failed to forge a regional cooperation during 22 years of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) existence, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have rekindled hope in SAARC to become relevant, although economically. This is politically incorrect but true.

Agro-terrorism has received little or no attention in India [or for that matter in South Asia] because terrorists have yet to employ agricultural assaults as a method of operation in this region. The threat scenario would involve a deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for purposes of undermining stability and/or generating fear among masses. Even terrorist group can achieve their objective by using radiological dispersal devices against food or water supply.

The Strategic Forces Command of India, which forms part of country’s Nuclear Command Authority, is responsible for the management and administration of strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal. Commensurating with the recommendations on national security management, the SFC came in to existence on January 4, 2003. While acknowledging the onerous tasks SFC was undertaking, more transparent measures have been declared recently geared towards clearing certain anomalies and in creating more transparencies on aspects of India’s nuclear policy.