Biological Terrorism: A Less Talked WMD Threat
In recent times, North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear adventurism has become so significant that important news was found missing from the current global strategic discourse on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The news was concerning the acceptance by North Korea of the presence of bio-weapons in their country. The North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju has declared to Japanese sources, "Other than nuclear, we also have many other things. We also have bio-weapons.”
The lack of any global debate on this issue signifies three things. First, the absence of WMDs at Iraq has considerably reduced the appeal of biological and chemical weapons. Secondly, the general feeling is that the threat from biological weapons is a very low probability threat and they are not as dangerous as made out to be, hence, do not qualify as WMDs. Thirdly, it speaks volumes about the failure of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) to such an extent that it has even failed to generate a global debate about this issue.
A critical analysis of the above positions indicates that all these interpretations are partially correct. However, such half-truths are unavoidable due to the lack of clarity about the nature of the threat itself. Such opinions are formulated because most of the studies carried out on this subject are based on imaginary scenario build-ups due to the lack of actual examples of terrorists using bio-weapons or countries engaging in bio-warfare.
Sadly, the Iraq war has shifted the focus of the global disarmament debate. The world community is taking the threat of WMDs, particularly from biological weapons, less seriously. However, the absence of WMDs in Iraq does not make the threat less serious. North Korea’s admission of the presence of these weapons indicates that still many ‘states of concern’ take these weapons seriously, and the danger exists.
Interestingly, the absence of WMDs in Iraq has even forced the CIA to have a re-look at their policies. Last month, they contradicted their recent findings about the bio-weapons programme of Cuba. Their new findings conclude that Cuba has no active bio-weapons programme. This signifies that the Americans are themselves not sure about Cuba’s biological weapons programme, and they are playing ‘diplomatically’ safe. It is extremely difficult to carry out an exact threat assessment of biological weapons because of the absence of any verification mechanism under the BTWC.
As such, the materials and equipment used for the development and production of bioweapons are ‘dual-use’ or suitable both for military purposes and legitimate commercial activities. Verifying compliance with the BTWC to a high level of confidence is exceedingly difficult.
Currently, we are caught in a great change in world history: the shift from the age of physics and chemistry to the age of biology and from the industrial revolution to the biotech century. The last few years have witnessed substantial growth in areas pertaining to biotechnology, genetic engineering and drug discovery. However, the same tools that are used to revolutionise the biotech industry could be used to make deadly bio-weapons. But, at the same time the existing pattern of actual bio-terror attacks does not provide a clear basis for predicting the nature of futuristic probable attacks. Hence, there will always be a debate about the seriousness of this threat till it becomes a reality.
At the same time, today, terrorist organizations are engaging stronger adversaries by exploiting their weaknesses and are looking for new tools and tactics of terror. The recent philosophical statement issued by Osama is indicative of the fact that he is going to make life more difficult for Americans in the near future. One never knows he may even opt for biological weapons because he has seen the American paranoia for such weapons after the ‘postal envelope anthrax’ outburst.
In the Indian context, such weapons are unlikely to be used. But, there were reports from J&K where the terrorist groups used cyanide-based injections. It is likely that in a valley, a ‘foreign terrorist’ group could use such weapons with an increase in their desperation levels. For India, there also exists a danger of agro-terrorism, where the country's economy could be ruined by deliberately exposing our livestock to disease-causing infectious agents or dangerous chemicals. The resulting losses may include animal deaths, economic damage and danger to public health from an unsafe food supply.
Preparing for such bioterrorism threats necessitates major investments in public health surveillance, timely contributions from the biomedical sciences and pharmaceutical industry, transnational collaborations and training. But, at the same time, there is a growing concern about the naturally occurring infectious disease problem in many parts of the world, such as SARS, bird flu, etc. So, the amount of resources, effort, and focus that we are devoting to the defence against biological weapons might ultimately be an important and positive boon for public health if looked upon in the context of all emerging and reemerging diseases. The current revolution in biotechnology, information technology, sensor technology and nanotechnology should be effectively used to strengthen biological defence techniques.