Chhattisgarh: Still the Battleground!
Union Home Minister, P.Chidambaram on 15 June 2011, revealed that the Maoist/Naxalite violence had dropped by over 40 per cent, and he credited this change to the success of the “two-pronged strategy”, a combination of the development programme and police actions being adopted by the Maoist affected provinces. He stressed that 80 policemen have been killed so far this year by Maoists as compared to 177 during this time last year. Civilian casualties, too, have come down to 190 from 296 in the previous year. Enthused by the “two-pronged” strategy, the Home Ministry has approved the sending of 5000 paramilitary troops to the Chhattisgarh-Orissa border, which has witnessed some Maoist activities recently. Has the “two-pronged” strategy really helped in bringing the violence down?
However, the ground reality does not match with the Home Minister’s analysis, especially in the case of Chhattisgarh and casualties related to the paramilitary and police personnel. Of late, Chhattisgarh has witnessed a series of Maoist attacks on security forces. As the troops and resources are being pumped into the ‘focus areas’, the degree of violence has also been increasing with a sudden surge in Maoist attacks. At least eleven Chhattisgarh police personnel were killed on 19 August in an apparent ambush by armed cadres of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist) in Bijapur district. Three CRPF personnel were killed in an encounter with Naxalites near Bheji village of Dantewada district on 12 June. This was in addition to the killing of nearly ten security personnel in the same district on 10 June. The government data indicates that Maoists' attacks on the security forces have increased. Minister of State for Home Jitendra Singh told Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2011, that “the number of CRPF personnel killed (during anti-Maoist operations) in 2010 and 2011 (up to August 2) are 132 and 20 respectively.” Of those 132 CRPF casualties, 76 personnel were killed in a Maoist ambush in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh in March 2010.
Government figures on Naxal violence reveal that for the last five years, the state has consistently remained in the top position in Naxalite-related casualties. In 2008, 242 of the total 721 Naxal-related deaths in the country were reported from this very State. In 2007, 369 out of 1,565 Naxal-related deaths in the country were reported from Chhattisgarh, and in 2006, 388 out of 678 deaths. Until July 2011, Chhattisgarh witnessed a total of 261 Maoist-related incidents with 61 civilians and 51 security forces casualties, which is the highest among all the Maoist-affected provinces in India.
Despite the two-pronged approach, the situation in Chhattisgarh has not changed. The local tribal became victims of gross violations of human rights at the hands of the Maoists. Many who were injured in the landmine blast on 28 February 2006 at Darbhaguda village were even stabbed and clubbed to death. All this resentment led to an organised resistance movement, Salwa Judum (meaning "Peace March" in the Gondi language). Sanctioned by both the State and opposition parties, this slowly grew into an undeclared civil war where one was either with the Naxalites or with the Salwa Judum.
Although the Naxals have been responsible for more killings, the response of the State Government to involve the civilians in the conflict and even recruiting members of Salwa Judum as Special Police Officers (SPOs) has aggravated the conflict. Around three lakh villagers had to flee their homes to avoid the ‘civil war’ and were lodged in camps. Currently, 26 such camps are operational in the Bastar region, and the condition of these camps is pathetic. The Supreme Court of India has already dubbed the arming of civilians as illegal.
The facts are that Tribals and Scheduled Castes comprise a significant part of the populace of Chhattisgarh's nine Maoist-infested districts of Dantewada, Bastar, Kanker, Balrampur, Surguja, Koriya, Rajnandgaon, Kawardha and Jashpur. These districts score an average of 25 to 30 per cent literacy rates compared to the state's 65.18 per cent literacy rate, a clear indicator of the root of the problem. While the deployment of troops is being increased to clear out the insurgents from one sector after another under the “two-pronged strategy”, a long-term solution must be found in the very problem that has always existed since its inception.
The condition of widely exploited tribes provided the breeding ground for a communist revolution. The Naxalites took over and distributed land records to the villagers, a job meant for the state's revenue department. The “pattas” given by the Naxalites have maps of the land allotted to them with the seal of the local commander. The Naxalite leaders settled land disputes, and if their “verdicts” were violated, the accused were awarded harsh punishment, including executions. The Naxalites also established their schools and health care centres. When the State of Chhattisgarh came into being in 2000, many expectations were raised, but nothing significantly changed for the better.
The gross discrepancy between ground realities and Indian policymakers’ statements on the conflict indicates that their conflict analysis is blurred. Police actions, especially in Chhattisgarh, heavily dominate the so-called two-pronged counter-Maoist insurgency strategy. The root of the problem of underdevelopment in this region is the forest dwellers' lack of control over natural resources. Today, their needs remain the same: development, education, and opportunities. Sending troops to physically root out or wean the Maoist's influence away, as is being done by the Home Ministry, keeping in line with the ‘two-pronged strategy’, is not the solution. Treating this problem primarily from a socioeconomic angle is the only antidote. There needs to be something to fill the void, or the influence will occur and grow again. In this regard, the Provisions of Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act of 1996 could provide the answer if the State and Central governments so will.