India-China Hydro Diplomacy: Beyond Information Sharing MoUs
This World Water Day (22 March 2013) calls for cooperation on transboundary rivers. With 276 transboundary river basins worldwide, it makes sense for countries in the Indian subcontinent and China to consider them seriously. While international institutions are trying to define a working definition of 'water security', will India be able to secure unhindered access to water for living beings across the McMahon line—the source of all perennial rivers flowing through India?
When India mooted the grand Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) in 2002, Bangladesh was understandably apprehensive about the social and environmental impacts as a lower riparian country to India. After nearly a decade or so, when China was constructing three hydropower dams on the Brahmaputra River (Yarlang Zangbo as called in China), similar anxiety and apprehension were conveyed by Indian establishment on equivocal terms- from basin States to Parliament. Like the Indian government's assurance to Dhaka on ILR, the former has received the same assurance of 'no downstream harm' or 'no negative impact' of the hydropower project. Meanwhile, the apprehension is running so high as the Indian government caught napping of the development across the McMahon line that, to save its face, India has gone further, referring to a possible water treaty with China on the Brahmaputra as soon as possible. Will China consider such a bilateral water-sharing treaty or agreement on the Brahmaputra River?
The Indian government's wishful rush to enter into a treaty will be rewarded, at best, with a renewal of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In fact, an MoU on sharing hydrological information about the Brahmaputra River between China and India will expire in early June of this year.
The main rivers originating from China entering India are the Brahmaputra in the North East and the Indus and Sutlej in the Northern Part of the country. In 2002, after much deliberation, India and China signed a MoU with a five-year duration to help forecast floods caused by the Brahmaputra in northeastern India. In accordance with the provisions in the MoU, the Chinese side provided hydrological information (water level, discharge and rainfall) in respect of three stations, namely, Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia, located on river Brahmaputra from 1st June to 15th October every year through email twice a day, which was utilized in the formulation of flood forecasts by the Central Water Commission (CWC) of India. In 1954, both countries signed a MoU to share hydrological data, but unfortunately, the border war between the two in 1962 halted the progress.
Without any agreement in place during the Parechu Lake threat in 2007, after much dilly-dallying, China allowed Indian delegations to visit Tibet and discuss various options to prevent the recurrence of such situations like Glacier Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) or artificial lakes. Subsequently, In 2008 a MoU was entered by both countries on sharing information on the Brahmaputra river in flood season with a five year validity. Another MoU was signed in April 2005 for the supply of water flow information in respect to Sutlej (Langquin Zangbu) during the flood season from the Tsada station on the Sutlej river. A new MoU on the supply of flood season hydrological information on River Sutlej was agreed upon in August 2010 by both countries.
Acknowledging the importance of transboundary rivers in their overall bilateral relations, during the Chinese President's visit to India in 2006, an agreement was reached to set up an Expert-Level Mechanism (ELM) to discuss interaction and cooperation on the provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management and other related issues regarding rivers. Four meetings were held with only headway in establishing trust among the members on hydrological information on the Brahmaputra River! The question arises whether the Indian members were informed about such hydropower projects in Brahmaputra during these four meetings in alternative venues. Have the Indian members of ELM raised the issue with their counterparts? The official briefings were saying otherwise.
At the same time, China agreed with the lower riparian of Brahmaputra- Bangladesh in 2010. However, the treaty is not functioning, and the Parliament is debating its functionality. A friendly government in Dhaka may be an advantage for now, but India can not avoid assessing the unpredictable and uncertain future. It is interesting to note that China simultaneously entered simple hydrological information-sharing MoUs with India and Bangladesh. Despite the rationale of the Beijing-Dhaka MoU, bypassing India -the largest Brahmaputra basin country, China has cornered India on the Brahmaputra River.
As long as China has not interfered in India's unilateral design to harness any international rivers that mostly originate in Chinese territory, India has been entering into bilateral treaties with Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. The recent Chinese power projects have shifted the bilateral bonhomie and opened a new era of hydro-diplomacy for India and the region.
India has consistently downplayed the role of third parties, be it the World Bank (for eastern Himalayan rivers), the US, Nepal, Bangladesh, China, or Bhutan in its bilateral water engagements. Earlier, Nepal and Bangladesh have made several demands for such tripartite or multi-party water treaties among the basin countries to make the water negotiations symmetric with respect to India. Now, India seems to be drawn into a relatively symmetric power game as both lower riparian lower-riparian and upper-riparian countries, at least in the case of the Brahmaputra River.
The track record of India and China in international water treaties is discouraging due to their geophysical position as relative upper-riparian countries. Both countries are not signatories to the two international covenants administering the international watercourse. The less hyped and much talked about 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses is almost dysfunctional due to the adamant nature of upper riparian countries. To substitute the General Assembly adopted least legally binding 1997 Convention, last November, the 1992 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 'Convention on Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lake' made open to all UN member countries to sign and ratify for lessening the friction on shared river water. Both China and India have not shown any interest in considering this Convention in the near future.
Given both countries' track records of unilateralism in harnessing shared water, there is an immediate need for a broader long-term framework on shared water between India and China. The border dispute, mostly the 1030 KM of Arunachal Pradesh, would be a significant hindrance as the Yarlang Zangbo enters India as the Brahmaputra in Arunachal Pradesh (as Dihang or Siang). China has already dismantled India's development aspiration on Arunachal Pradesh in the Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2009.
As Chinese President Xi Jinping categorically differentiate the border dispute from another significant potential issue, a step forward would be to share the prospective plans for the Brahmaputra Rivers by both countries under the water-sharing framework. The perspective plan includes both countries' past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects or activities on the river. China, India and Bangladesh should take a cumulative impact assessment study on the Brahmaputra River Basin in the light of climate change, river ecology, and overall environmental considerations. Both countries' leadership must ensure that ELM has a broad mandate to continue dialogue regularly and effectively regarding climate setting for treaty-making. Both Asian economies need to cooperate on shared water. This World Water Day may entice such prospects in Delhi and Beijing on the sidelines of the fifth BRICS Summit at Durban.