Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Ten Years After
Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a successful trip to Central Asia and Russia in the past few weeks. Various new collaborations -- from tourism to terrorism -- got formalized during these visits. One influential agenda of this visit was to acquire the uranium required for nuclear energy production. Mr. Modi successfully worked out various modalities with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia in this regard. A few months back, he also collaborated with Canada and Australia regarding uranium trade with India. Interestingly, today, India can freely purchase uranium because of the boldness shown by Mr. Manmohan Singh ten years back. The framework for the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal agreement was signed on July 18, 2005, which essentially is responsible for allowing India to acquire uranium.
Owing to the nuclear tests conducted by India during 1974 and 1998 (Pokhran I & II), for almost three decades, India was put under harsh sanctions. No country was allowed to transfer or sell the sensitive technology to India. All this led to what is famously known as India’s Technological Apartheid, causing major problems in India’s defence, nuclear and space sectors. For example, India’s space program suffered considerably because the Russians could transfer cryogenic technology to India. Hence, even today, India cannot launch heavy satellites alone. The excellent aspect of this Technological Apartheid was that the Indian scientists took the challenge and developed various technologies independently. Hence, today, India boasts of having various successful indigenous technological programs. However, all this took time, and India could not make the desired progress. In this globalised world, it is impractical to develop every technology at home. Also, some minerals like uranium are unavailable within India’s geographical boundaries.
The US-India nuclear deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of US domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. On its part, India has broadly undertaken a civil-military nuclear separation plan. Now, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can undertake official inspections of India’s non-military nuclear establishments. Subsequently, the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. This is why Modi has been successful in ink agreements for uranium purchases.
On the tenth anniversary of this deal, it is crucial to do a dispassionate analysis of the recent history. More than any political dispensation (say, UPA-1 in India or the Republicans in the US), it could be said that this deal was achieved essentially because of the personalities. Nuclear energy meets only 2 to 3 per cent of India’s overall energy needs. However, India needs to invest in nuclear technology for clean and sustainable energy in the future. Mr. Manmohan Singh was also aware that this deal was the key to taking India out of the sanctions regime. In reality, more than the nuclear energy, this deal helps to secure India’s strategic interests. ‘Rise of China’ is a reality, fast gaining a superpower status. Naturally, it was in India’s interest to get out of any technological and hence strategic apartheid. Today, India can buy whatever technology (military or civil) it wants from the global market. We have developed strategic partnerships with various countries. We have increased the scale of joint military exercises in many countries. Mr Singh had more of a mute support from his party and no support from the opposition. But he was convinced and put his entire political prestige at stake to ensure this deal would go through.
For President Bush, it was also not an easy journey. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the cornerstone of US foreign policy since the early seventies. Accepting any nuclear deal with India was going against the principles that the US had championed so far. The economist Mr Singh probably made Bush see the point that such a deal offers the US an opportunity to revive its dying nuclear industry with almost $100 to $150 billion worth of business for grabs in the next decade. It is also essential to consider the critical role played on the sidelines by the Indian Diaspora at that time.
Unfortunately, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan came as a bolt from the blue for this deal. India has not made much progress due to safety and liability issues that have arisen since then. During the January 2015 visit by US President Mr Barack Obama’s visit to India, it was announced that a ‘breakthrough understanding’ had been reached on operationalizing this deal. However, issues concerning risk management remain unresolved. Also, the issues concerning holding suppliers liable for any ‘accident’ are not fully addressed. It would take much more time and a significant amount of diplomatic and legal bargaining to ensure that this deal starts offering actual benefits envisaged by the original makers of this deal. Fortunately, the US is not India's only supplier of nuclear energy technology. France, Russia and a few other states are keen to do nuclear reactor business with India, and India has already started engaging them. Regrettably enough, instituting a nuclear power plant has become a tool for dishonest politics in India; hence, no timeline can be presented regarding establishing the proposed nuclear power plants in the country. However, this deal offers the country a moral and diplomatic victory as India is no longer an untouchable’ in global technology commerce.