Ricin Threat and the Jihadist Conspiracy against India
The Gujarat Police’s Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) on 8 November 2025 arrested Ahmed Mohiyuddin Saiyed, a doctor from Hyderabad (Telangana), along with firearms and nearly 4 kg of castor-bean mash, which is used to extract ricin, a bio-toxin, at Adalaj toll plaza on Ahmedabad–Mehsana Road in Gandhinagar. His call records led to the arrest of two Uttar Pradesh residents, Azad Suleman Sheikh and Mohammad Saleem Khan, in Banaskantha, Gujarat.
Initial investigation indicated that Saiyed had been in contact with one Abu Khadija, a Pakistan-based operative linked to Islamic State-Khurasan Province (ISKP), a transnational jihadist group. Saiyed, a China-trained physician, was manufacturing large quantities of ricin, possibly for mass poisoning. He conducted reconnaissance at several security-sensitive sites in Lucknow, Delhi, and Ahmedabad. The Gujarat Ricin plot involved the bio-terror links of radicalised individuals with cross-border operatives. It reflects the ISKP’s broader strategy of using skilled individuals for low-cost, high-impact attacks.
International Regulations of ‘Scare Chemical’
Ricin (from castor beans/Ricinus communis) remains appealing to extremist groups more for its symbolic and psychological significance than for its actual lethality. Classified by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a Category B bioterrorism agent and listed under Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), ricin is a typical ‘bio-chemical toxin’ well-known for its high toxicity. Still, it has a low technical barrier for crude extraction from castor beans. Regulatory oversight on ricin control remains strict. Under the CWC, it has no legitimate large-scale use outside of research or defence. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and national laws such as India’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (2005) also ban the production or possession of any biotoxin by non-state actors.
Even with the regulatory prohibitions in place, terrorists and criminal gangs are drawn to it because of its easy availability, simplicity of processing, and its reputation as a ‘scare chemical’. The toxin’s notoriety stems from its use in Cold War assassinations and its frequent appearance in extremist manuals circulated by Al-Qaeda and ISIS channels. Despite its notoriety, ricin’s practical use as a biological or chemical weapon remains very limited. So far, no terrorist group has managed to produce weapon-grade ricin (more than 95 per cent purity). All known plots, from Al-Qaeda’s experiments in the early 2000s to the Islamic State’s efforts, involved only crude brown mash with less than 5 per cent active toxin, incapable of causing mass harm.
Weaponisation requires not only biochemical expertise but also a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) facility, chromatography purification systems, and reliable aerosol delivery systems. These resources are clearly beyond the reach of most non-state actors, like terrorist groups or criminal organisations. However, an individual scientist or doctor with access to such facilities could develop the biotoxin. Ricin is unstable above 60°C, degrades quickly in moist air, and needs advanced lyophilization to remain viable as an aerosol. Even in small amounts, its spread is inefficient; nearly four tons of aerosolized ricin would be required to match the killing power of just one kilogram of anthrax.
For the complete article, Visit MP-IDSA WebPortal: Animesh Roul, "Ricin Threat and the Jihadist Conspiracy against India," IDSA Comments, November 13, 2025. https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/ricin-threat-and-the-jihadist-co…